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A Long-Lasting Crisis
MARCO AURÉLIO NOGUEIRA
EVEN IF IT HAS ALL ended in a truce, a cold analysis of the crisis that shook the Brazilian Senate to the medulla and spilled over onto the Presidential Palace suggests that the storm has only lulled. Far from being resolved, 
the crisis merely slumbers. Its terms and protagonists, as well as the various 
institutional factors that propelled it, remain untouchable, and there is little 
to suggest that the near future will usher in a virtuous phase qualitatively any 
different to that which lay at the root of the crisis. 
 It is a paradoxical situation.
 In the short-term at least there is no chance of a solution arising that 
is powerful enough to expel the toxins that have contaminated the Brazilian 
political system, some of which have been, over the course of history, seeped 
into the very bedrock of our social experience and political practices. There is no 
power out there strong enough to stock the House with a decent parliamentary 
corps – the potential existence of which is yet to be proven - capable of growing 
in leadership and of orchestrating, in the near future, the ethical, political and 
institutional re-edifi cation we so badly need.  
 For its part, the tarnished image of the Senate – and, by extension, of the 
Legislature, the Executive, the parliamentarians and their parties – has proved 
so deep, cut so close to the bone, that it has reached saturation point and a crux 
of infl ection.  Even if not yet wholly evident, one cannot deny that a new agenda 
must surely emerge from the mounting rubble.
 As we all know, very often societies need to teeter on the edge of the abyss 
before they rally forces, heal their wounds and set once again about the business 
of building a future. Recent Brazilian history is replete with illustrations. For 
example, the dictatorial regime of 1964 had to sink to the extremes of savagery 
and tyranny witnessed in 1975 before the few roused the many in a push for 
change and re-democratization. Infl ation had to spiral to 230% per annum in 
1985 before a technical and political drive got underway, with the Cruzado Plan, 
to secure monetary stabilization, a goal obtained some years later. The slime of 
corruption, racketeering and cronyism had to spill out from under the doors of 
the Presidential palace before society campaigned for the impeachment of the 
president of the Republic in 1992, begetting a new political cycle for the nation. 
 Recognizing this does not mean accepting the existence of 
a rigorous, objective and unrelenting law, but rather simply entails 
acknowledging a certain tendency or probability running through the 
logic of facts. There were other touch-and-go moments in recent history 
in which, as we know, the upswing did not come. The Mensalão crisis of 
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2005 (which uncovered a government scheme for buying Congressional 
support through a monthly stipend) springs readily to mind. Though it shook 
the structures of the Presidency and political system as a whole, it neither stopped 
Lula being re-elected in 2006 nor eliminated the bad habits that impregnate 
and disrupt relations between the Executive and the Legislature.  Even so, the 
perpetrators did not come away wholly unscathed: a certain spell was broken, and 
at least one party had to embark on the arduous and painful process of trying to 
reconcile itself with its own history. 
 In the future, 2009 may well be seen as prodigious in regurgitating trends 
that have prevailed in recent Brazilian politics. Lula cranked up the style that has 
won him such high approval ratings, hitting an impressive 84% at the start of that 
year. His dedicated insistence on dialoguing directly with the masses, regardless 
of party lines, his concern with building bridges between the federal and local 
governments in order to boost the viability of strategic public policies and lay 
the groundwork for the up-coming presidential succession, his seductive and 
paternal language, coupled with his political sagacity, have become hallmarks of 
his two mandates. Despite its somewhat “populist” fl avor, Lula’s administration 
succeeded in producing institutional life and a governmental routine, elements 
that are vital in a nation so lacking in orchestration and tools of coordination. 
In good measure, Lula’s way of doing politics has Brazil written all over it, 
refl ecting and reproducing a standard of political conduct that is deeply engrained 
in Brazilian historico-social experience. As the political scientist Luiz Werneck 
Vianna likes to say, it is a kind of updated version of the “cordiality” that was, and 
remains, so important in the formation of the Brazilian nation state. 
 Throughout 2009, the opposition (The Brazilian Social Democratic Party 
– PSDB, and The Democratic Party - DEM) strove to ferret out and denounce 
the slightest whiff of pre-campaign electioneering. Though they took this as their 
core approach, they went about it in such a blundering and incompetent way 
that it served only to exacerbate what was already a miserable slump in form.  To 
demand that a government refrain from political maneuvering or from seeking 
to draw electoral benefi t from its actions makes as little sense as to suggest that 
true opposition means working at all times to demolish the status-quo. Their 
denunciations merely demonstrated their fear and worry at Lula’s machinations, 
perhaps being a knee-jerk reaction typical of opposition parties scurrying to put 
their own house in order. 
 Both the Lula style of politics and the opposition’s fragility in dealing 
with it illustrate the diffi culty Brazilian society has faced in kick-starting 
a virtuous cycle of democratic life, reform and social reorganization. The 
Senate’s ongoing attempts to completely sully its public image and denigrate its 
functions refl ect a process driven by the compulsion of politicians and parties to 
prioritize short-term interests.  The popularization of the Presidency has gained 
momentum under the charismatic fi gure of Lula. The fact that leaders of another 
ilk have not yet emerged denotes the want of a suffi ciently lucid and united 
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democratic opposition that is courageous enough to spurn short-term gains for 
the benefi t of society. 
 It would be no exaggeration to say that, in Brazil today, the political 
climate is one racked with dilemmas, paradoxes and question-marks, in which 
there is no Machiavellian-style Prince (Statesman) and from which all of Antonio 
Gramsci’s modern-day princes (political parties) have fl ed, leaving nobody to 
organize ideas and interests around a project for society. The Senate crisis is but 
one more manifestation of this fact; a no doubt relevant detail, but a mere detail 
nonetheless. 
 The Realism in Question
 A striking feature of the present crisis is the passivity with which Brazilian 
politicians are facing it. Sometimes indifferent to its ramifi cations, sometimes deaf 
to the expectations of public opinion, the politicians have been found wanting, 
as if contaminated by some form of parliamentarian compunction to close ranks. 
Through the occasional chink jar (largely irresponsible) spasms of indignation and 
vehemence.
 How are we to understand that the supposed jewel in the crown of 
Brazilian politics could be allowed to languish like this, bleeding from its open 
wounds and left to fester? Has the Senate lost all aura and relevance, such that its 
inner turbulence causes no disturbance to the political and governmental routine? 
And what of the self-esteem of the senators, who do not seem at all bothered by 
the institution’s loss of prestige, and, consequently, by the belittlement of their 
own mandates?
 The Senate crisis is visible, but there is more to it than that. We need to 
qualify its scope with a certain rigor, if only not to overburden the word “crisis”. 
The situation is not terminal and we do not fi nd ourselves in the anteroom to 
political bankruptcy. Nor are we in the presence of an “organic crisis” capable 
of affecting the State as a whole, or, for that matter, of a “hegemonic crisis” that 
could strip us of all orientation or moral compass. 
 However, we are justifi ed in speaking of a crisis because our institutions 
are not living up to society’s expectations and are becoming mere caricatures of 
themselves. It is not purely a matter of senator Sarney, or of this or that party, or 
even of the Legislature as a whole. The Judiciary, too, has long been in need of 
reform. Not even the Presidency works as it should, if we measure the president’s 
popularity against the achievements of his government. 
 Should we prefer to avoid the heavy connotations of the word ‘crisis’, 
we might say that the nation is currently suffering from a serious political and 
institutional malaise. 
 This has not been brought upon us solely because the president of the 
Senate has sunk into a mire that has seen him squander the political capital 
accrued over decades of activity. It is not even a problem of corruption, the 
misappropriation of public funds or of nepotism, though these are certainly 
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contributing factors. The dwindling moral authority of the president of the Senate 
now spreads throughout the House, and tarnishes the other Powers too, from the 
Legislature to the Executive. 
 The crisis, which at fi rst sight seems to be localized and contained, 
and is treated as such, has in fact spread throughout the whole political corps, 
impregnating and blemishing the institutional structure and the body politic. 
 Were this not the case, the system would have reacted. It would certainly 
not be standing passively by, watching its own emaciation. The scenario is grim: 
if the political system fails to react, will that not have been because the country 
does not need it to; does not recognize itself within it?  In other words, the 
institutions don’t even have to work properly for things to continue as they are, in 
this irritating and normalized languor. We will not slump into the abyss without 
them, but we won’t make any progress either. Could it be that the institutions 
have become something irksomely ‘functional’, impotent to help or hinder the 
political system as it continues to tick over?
 The Senate plays an important role in the Brazilian institutional 
engineering. Its brief is to dampen or undo the occasional “distempers” of 
the Congress, balance out the representation and aggrandize the Republic. It 
has done neither, and if it fails to function, or functions badly, it cripples the 
institutions, aggravating their many defi ciencies. When the institutions falter, 
mediocrity and emptiness prevail. The only reason the situation does not 
deteriorate further is because it is precisely at these moments that the good must 
stand up and deliver.
 Hence a serious question hovers above the Executive and the President’s 
own ruling party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the Workers’ Party. Why did 
they decide to shield the president of the Senate and throw water on the crisis? 
The easy answer, loyal to the “political realism” with which many have tried to 
explain the actions of the Presidency, is that it was to protect the coalition with 
the PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) and prevent the 
Senate from falling into the hands of the opposition. But this response simply 
prolongs the agony of the Senate and destabilizes national political life. It neither 
assuages nor improves the situation; it does not resolve any of the country’s 
political problems. It does not even help the government, or boost the prospects 
of its candidates for the 2010 elections.  
 Realism is valuable in politics. In this fi eld, not everything that glistens 
is gold and the best deeds are not always done by the best people, nor the worst 
by the worst.  Max Weber said as much in his famous essay on politics as a 
vocation. And we all know that, in political environments, the evidence does not 
always correspond to the facts. It is obvious that the opposition had a hand in 
the avalanche of denunciations against Sarney. It is also clear that the opposition 
would benefi t from his downfall, especially given the blood-pact the President 
sealed with the senator and his party. But a little opposition is exactly what a 
democratic government needs, if only not to sit on its laurels or get the notion 
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that it controls society as a whole. The opposition parties wanted to use the 
Senate crisis to gain leverage for 2010 and boost their performance. And what is 
wrong with that? What we cannot accept is that the government should believe it 
can emerge unscathed from its bulletproofi ng of the Senate.
    No realism should be allowed to clash head-on with the traditions from 
which parties and politicians acquire their meaning, at the risk of destroying 
them. Our time is not particularly propitious to doctrinarian identities, loyalties 
or fi delities. However, the parties and politicians who want to be coherent have 
to fi ght against this, even if only to preserve the ties that bind them to their own 
histories and therefore lend more ethical vigor to politics. 
 Furthermore, no realism justifi es going against the expectations of 
democratic public opinion, good sense and the voice of the man in the street. Of 
course, a government should never slaver to any of these, but it ignores them at 
the risk of extrapolating the bounds of realism. It is a matter of syntony. 
 Parliament under Siege
 One could add a second paradox to that outlined above, one that is 
every bit as intriguing and worrying. Contemporary democracy cannot function 
without a Legislature that is strong and active, but the power of the Executive 
and decisionism grows with the mounting pressures for participation, direct 
democracy, free social movement. The Parliaments seem to have lost their 
axis, being caught between governmental decisionism and social spontaneity 
(Nogueira, 2005). 
 There is a fundamental reason for this. Modern parliaments are 
institutions of the nation state, inherent to the constitution of national political 
systems in societies of “average” complexity. And the present globalized, 
transnational, hypercapitalist, superconnected world is confi guring itself both as 
a system that surpasses the nation state (albeit without eliminating it), and as a 
global society that comes unaccompanied by a global State and which combines 
perfectly with the emergence of “high” complexity societies. The political 
systems (parliaments, parties, the political class, governments) are thrown into 
crisis because they refl ect the constitution of this “global information society”, 
the effects of globalization and the reduced sovereignty of the nation States. 
They become more turbulent and less capable of interacting virtuously with the 
cultures and social structures that derive from the new terms of globalized life, 
that is, from plural, fragmented, refl exive, swift and explosive societies. Under 
conditions of “high” complexity, all the hubs of power tend to lose their sense of 
direction and proper functioning (Nogueira, 2004). 
 It is the same the world over, but is perhaps exacerbated in Latin-
American nations, which tend to radicalize their modernity without assuaging 
the pains of their peripheral condition.  Such nations are hypermodern but 
peripheral, and they share all the problems of this dual existential condition. By 
hypermodernizing, they become technology-driven, fuelled by information, the 
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market and competition; they become fast-moving, plural and fragmented. Yet by 
failing to shirk their peripheral status, they remain dependent, internally riven and 
characterized by a malformed citizenship and democracy that can neither round 
itself off nor enjoy a political culture spread evenly across the different channels of 
social life.
 As a result, the image public opinion maintains of the Parliament and 
parliamentarians is prevalently negative. As a reaction to the “hyper-functionality” 
of the political system, the citizen of today tends to substitute political 
engagement (party loyalty, the legitimation of governments and electoral passion) 
with ethical indignation. As such, politics (instituted and systemic) changes form 
and ceases to constitute a priority investment on the part of the people. 
 In coming to the fore as a reaction to “excessive” social demands and 
the alleged sluggishness of the political system as a whole, Executive decisionism 
aggravates the situation, exacerbating the ill effects of the “irrationalities” existent 
within the system of representation (especially in its electoral dimension), the 
fragility and unpreparedness of the political class and the spectacle syndrome that 
drains politics of all civic sense. 
 Today, at the same time as the Legislature sees its strategic role in the 
politico-social game reiterated, it also sees itself submitted to a complex set of 
pressures and challenges stemming from the very process of the reorganization 
of contemporary life and, above all, its ramifi cations on the different concrete 
societies. The Legislature has, itself, become an “environment” burdened with 
demands and wrangling with complicated problems of organization, functioning 
and performance. Today, in general terms, it is an institution under siege. 
 The Legislature needs reinsertion within the contemporary democratic 
and social reality. Even though it continues to fulfi ll its fundamental functions, 
it has not yet succeeded in fully adapting to the deep-set social changes and 
transformations in democracy that have emerged since globalization and through 
the confi guration of the “information society”. If modernity has ceased to be 
“solid” and become “liquid” (Bauman, 2001); if the “fl uxes of power” have 
become less important than the “power of fl uxes” (Castells, 1999); if society has 
become complex and refl exive (Giddens, 1991), then there should be no surprise 
that crises of legitimacy and functioning have beset our political institutions. 
 The Legislature is harried by demands from society, civil society, the 
market and the State. It fi nds it diffi cult to adapt and respond to the mounting 
pressures, demands and claims, and this has affected its performance. When faced 
with controversial or strategic themes, the Legislature appears to hyperventilate.  
It does not cease to function, nor fulfi ll its role, but it does so at the cost of great 
“suffering”. 
 The loss of face and the general malaise that surround the Legislature 
stem from both deep social changes, which have increased social differentiation 
and caused interests to spiral, and the transformations underway within 
contemporary democracy itself. From a classic representative democracy based on 
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parties and bonds of loyalty, we are moving toward a new form of representative 
democracy in which the “public” is a major player (Manin, 1996): the centrality 
of the individual is being substituted by the centrality of the “masses”. The 
representatives (parliamentarians) of today fi nd themselves surrounded by 
participative mechanisms and corporate and media pressures. The electorate, for 
its part, is better informed, more stable and quicker to change opinion – in short, 
less loyal to politicians.  As a result, the Legislature tends to drift away from 
society, with which it often fails to act in syntony. 
 So what can be done to bridge the (negative) gap between Parliament and 
parliamentarians and the positive functioning of the legislative institutions? How 
could we defi ne the positive political functioning of Parliament?
 Democracy cannot afford to ignore the conditions under which the 
Legislature has to work, whether in typical procedural and systemic terms (its 
relationship with the Executive, internal organization, regimental procedures, 
etc.) or with regard to qualifi ed human resources. The very fi gure of the 
parliamentarian, his/her advisors and the functionaries of the House not only 
need to be rethought, but “reeducated”.  
 Two main measures come to mind as a pair of kingposts or pillars for any 
institutional reform one might consider.
 The Legislature needs to expand and accelerate the technical, intellectual 
and ethico-political qualifi cation of its members, whether the parliamentarians 
or their advisors. This would allow them to top up on the knowledge they need 
to exercise a legislative function, but also to better organize their information 
and human resources. After all, for the Legislature to work well, it needs both a 
competent “political class” and a consistent and well-prepared staff dedicated to 
providing the parliamentarian with the necessary technical and administrative 
support. This means increasing and fi ne-tuning the role of the parties as staff-
selection mechanisms. 
The full recovery of the Legislature depends on how it comes to be viewed 
over the course of a reform of the political system. The more democratic this 
reform is, the more open it is to civil society and the interests of the majority, 
the more valorized the legislature will become, restoring it to an active role in 
contemporary life. The resumption of a consistent and wide-ranging strategy for 
the reform not only of the state apparatus, but of the State itself will certainly 
play an important role in this operation. After all, the problem assailing the 
Legislature does not pertain to it alone, but involves the state as a whole.
A “good” Parliament depends on good information and knowledge, in 
other words, on both the production and organization of data and the analyses 
and diagnostics used to deliberate upon that data. This requires technical and 
intellectual operations that promote the self-understanding of societies and 
consciousness of their citizens. Clarity when it comes to institutional reform 
and advances in terms of educational programs for Parliament can be obtained 
through the greater incorporation of critical thought by political systems. 
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Hollow Parties
The processes and problems currently undermining the Brazilian 
Legislature – and sometimes the modern parliament in general – fi nd clear 
correspondence on the level of one of the main protagonists of the political 
system: the political parties. 
In mid-March, 2009, when the current stage in the Senate crisis was just 
beginning, the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) released the fi ndings of a survey 
on the Brazilian political parties. The material is expressive and warrants close 
attention.
In January 2008, roughly 90% of Brazilian voters had no formal links to 
any political party. One year later, this percentage had risen to 91.6%, or 119.7 
million people. The comparison calls even more attention when we consider 
that the electorate grew by 2.9 million voters during that same period, while the 
number of non-party affi liates rose by 4.3 million.  
The trend seems consistent. It affects all parties and in all units of the 
Federation. The only exception was the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), 
connected to the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which managed to 
swell its party membership from 121 thousand to 157 thousand. The PMDB 
alone (the largest party in the country) lost 14% of its adherents (roughly 300 
thousand people), with similar percentages of loss incurred by PSDB, DEM and 
PT. Even the ideological micro-parties, such as the Socialist Unifi ed Workers 
Party (PSTU) and the Worker’s Cause Party (PCO) shrank by 3%. 
How can we explain this? Are the parties letting the electorate down 
or has the latter found new ways of channeling its demands? Is the problem an 
institutional one that could be resolved with fairer and more adequate legislation? 
is it of a moral order, spurred by the “rife corruption” and “high salaries” that 
have so tarnished the image of politicians in the public eye, as would allege 
a complicated current of opinion that spans the spectrum from the ultra-
conservative right to the far left? Or do we need a well-formulated social critical 
theory in order to arrive at a rounded comprehension of the facts?
There are no ready answers, but it is easy to see the political impact of 
this lack of ties. The weakened relationship between parties and the electorate 
is an indication of the threadbare state of the bonds between society and the 
political system. It could be that the citizens no longer care all that much about 
the way they are governed, preferring to distance themselves from representative 
democracy and its fi gureheads.  However, without the citizens, representation 
falters and winds up under the monopoly of the parties, which become the sole 
protagonists, the “owners” of the game, its rules and the results. With this, 
representative politics becomes the activity of professionals who are not “seen” by 
the public and who make no attempt to bring the public centre-stage. 
It is a delicate issue, as representative democracy continues to be most 
vital in complex and multi-ethnical societies like our own. In this type of 
democratic system, the fundamental role of ensuring the operability of politics, 
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social demands and governmental decisions has fallen to the parties, which were 
invented precisely to assume such a role. 
The parties devote their energies to organizing their ascent to power 
or their opposition to its current holders. They take it upon themselves to 
create conditions whereby the partial interests of this or that class can evolve 
and intersect with the partial interests of other classes, thus giving rise to 
a common denominator that more faithfully represents the conjunct. Even 
leftist organizations, which have always refused to limit their activities to the 
narrow plane of Parliament, represent social groups, to which they lend a voice, 
sometimes even functioning as the builders of hegemony, of new cultural 
orientations. It is the parties and the struggles they wage amongst themselves 
both inside and outside the Parliament that make it possible to process demands 
democratically and draw up a political agenda. 
If the citizens begin to ignore the parties, alarm bells ring. And they ring 
louder still when we realize that there is small chance of society being able to self-
represent or resolve its problems exclusively via “direct participation”.
In order to understand the problem more clearly, we have to look at the 
way we live.  The exodus from political parties has a lot to do with a deep change 
that has shaken the social order. Some sociologists, such as Zigmunt Bauman, like 
to use the metaphor of “liquid life” in reference to this occurrence, underscoring 
the exacerbation of an old process of “melting” that assails all that is “solid” and 
institutionalized.  As a result, uncertainty and insecurity tend to dampen the 
citizen’s desire for political participation. Others, such as Manuel Castells, speak of 
a “network society”, underlining the prevalence of information technologies that, 
by becoming part of everyday life, alter the way we communicate, work and develop 
our consciousness. Tangling up all the channels of decision-making, in a dynamic 
in which economics prevails over politics, “network society” saps the power from 
the hubs (governments, States, parties), causing the citizenry, frustrated by the 
incapacity of the powers-that-be to control spaces and people, to lose interest. 
These confi gurations marry well with the individualization and 
democratization so typical of our time, which “free” individuals from their 
groups of reference and encourage them to think for themselves, that is, to act 
and decide autonomously, even if following standards set by the media, peer 
groups and the market. In an environment where everything seems to be out 
of control, perverse and subtle forms of control tend to spread.  The obsession 
with control (over people and over life itself) dwells paradoxically alongside a 
boundless desire for freedom. We yearn for more and more control precisely 
because we do not really control anything at all. 
In this manner, society ceases to forge simple and automatic bonds and 
allegiances, thus hurling identities into turmoil. One can imagine the effects this 
has on politics. 
We ought not take this hypothesis to the letter, as social changes are 
asymmetrical, spread over lengthy periods and it takes a long time for the 
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institutions to pick up on them. Yet if these explanations serve any purpose at 
all it is to alert us to what is going on in the deep rivers by which societies move.        
They serve to tell us that the institutions have to change, that our practices 
cannot go on as they are, that political language has to be renewed day by day, 
regardless of beliefs, books or heroes. 
Either democratic politics honors its commitment to secularization and 
abandons the gods that no longer speak the language of the day or it risks losing 
value, irremediably. 
The Republic in Question
 Another interesting indicator of the breadth and gravity of the political 
crisis can be found in the II Pacto Republicano de Estado por um Sistema de 
Justiça Mais Acessível, Ágil e Efetivo (Second Republican Pact of the State for a 
More Accessible, Agile and Effective Legal System), signed by representatives of 
the three powers of the Federative Republic on March 13, 2009. The presidents 
of the Federal Court, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate joined President 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in drafting a six-page document in which they made 
a commitment to having projects passed that would confer greater accessibility 
and agility upon the legal system, extending full protection to fundamental 
human rights.
Curiously, the subject attracted little attention, scarcely even registering on 
the political agenda. 
A pact is both a suspension of litigation and a commitment to defense, 
something in which two or more parties with different mindsets and private 
interests agree to assume a mutual commitment in the name of a common 
good, one of value to all and understood to be under threat. It also demands 
cooperation and implies a resolution to remain loyal to a cause, principle or 
institution. 
If a republican pact is made it is because the Republic is somehow 
believed to be at risk, not necessarily mortal risk, but perhaps in danger of not 
being adequately valued or of misfi ring with troubling frequency. If such a 
pact takes the legal system as it focus it is because the existing system is a mess, 
malfunctioning or failing to deliver on its duties to society. If the commitment is 
to make the system more accessible, agile and effective, it is because it is adjudged 
to be beyond the reach of the average citizen, slow and under-achieving. 
If this is the case, as the document suggests it is, then we truly are 
in the throes of a crisis that is chipping away at the ethical bedrock and 
institutional foundations of the Brazilian State and threatening the very heart 
of the Republican system, which beats, as we well know, to the rhythm of the 
fundamental human rights, law and justice for all. 
The list of priority points compiled by the signatories paints a grim picture. 
It includes, for example, concerns about the penal code and places great emphasis 
on criminal investigation, the resources for this end, processual prison, provisional 
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freedom and the criteria for phone tapping and the use of IT in investigations. All 
in the interests of curbing excesses and protecting the dignity of the individual. 
The document envisages changes to the Penal Code that would make provisions 
to deal with crimes by death squads or private militias, as well as legislation 
covering organized crime and money laundering. There is also concern about the 
abuse of authority and how to punish agents and civil servants who infringe upon 
basic rights. The pact also considers improving the Justice Ministry’s Victim and 
Witness Protection Program and labor law as a means of expanding the safety net 
provided to labor relations. 
If we consider the content of the document, the situation would seem 
to be calamitous.  The commitment made by the Three Powers appears to be 
endorsing the thesis put forward by the President of the Supreme Court, Gilmar 
Mendes, that Brazil is effectively a “Police state”, given the excesses perpetrated 
by the Federal Police in such operations as Castelo de Areia and Satiagraha, 
involving bankers, businesspeople, police delegates, politicians and civil servants. 
The scenario, it seems, is one of horror. 
Pacts of this kind have an undeniable symbolic quality. They are signed to 
suggest or ground a strategy, attract allies and orient a possible plan of action. A 
lot of it is about making the right noises. In this particular case, it would not be 
absurd to see the Republican Pact as a means of “settling the score” between the 
supreme organs of the State. It might, for example, lead to the plugging of leaks 
in the Federal Police or push for better relations between the Executive and the 
Legislature.  It might dig a trench around the supremacy of the Judicial State over 
its Administrative or Political counterparts, or serve as a platform for someone’s 
declarations of love for the rites of Justice. In short, nothing unusual in a period 
in which political confl icts, tensions and differences are breaching the political 
banks and fl ooding the terrain of the legal spectacle, taken as more rigorous and 
impartial. It’s the so-called judicialization of politics. 
Another way of analyzing the pact is to remember that operations designed 
to defend and valorize a Republic cannot limit themselves to the protagonism 
of the powers. A republican mode of governing and organizing the State is that 
in which the public and private interests are kept separate, the law prevails and 
the citizenry is free to choose its directors. It requires powers that are alert and 
legitimate, but it only makes sense and survives if it is run by good politicians and 
is shot through, from top to bottom, with civic education. A community only 
has republican value when it is organized and governed by institutions and public 
habits that are understood and defended by the citizens, who know the value of 
curtailing a given social class or group’s ability to impose its personal interests and 
privileges over those of any other.
Acts of corruption, the abuse of power or miscarriages of Justice cannot 
be seen pure and simply as the problem of civil servants, judges or politicians. 
They are not associated with a degradation of morality – that which pertains to 
moral subjects, who weigh their actions against their own consciences -, but of 
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ethics, which pertains to the ethical subject, whose actions are weighed against the 
judgments of others.  It has a lot more to do with intersubjective life and social 
organization than with personal character or institutional power. 
As far as society can tell, the Second Pact has not had any repercussions on 
this score, nor any meaningful ramifi cations. Full of good intentions, it basically 
served as a thermometer for the state of the Republic and the “indifference” of 
its citizens. In such a context, it would be surprising if the political class and 
representative institutions worked properly, pleasing the majority, yielding results 
and building dams against corruption.
Dilemmas and Challenges
The present crisis is laden with explosive ingredients and the level of debate 
has sunk so low that we have to believe that some reaction grounded in good 
sense and political intelligence will arise in the near future. After all, the boat 
is not adrift, and we cannot say that the nation has exhausted all its reserves of 
initiative, lucidity and creativity.
However, this is not the most important factor. The real fuel behind the 
fi re resides elsewhere. The crisis coincides with a heightened period of social 
indifference to organized and institutional politics. Society has convinced itself 
that an active political system is dispensable. It looks at the present system and 
fi nds that when it does work it just causes problems and that when it does not 
work it makes no difference whatsoever. Having just a “smithering” of State, 
enough to provide basic services in security, health and education, is quite 
enough, and may even make life better, especially for the poor.  
This line of thought is gaining wider acceptance in society. Dangerously 
so, as it happens, because it pushes for a less cohesive, less solidary life, more 
dependent on the effort and initiative of the individual, unable to create equality 
and ensure rights for all, dominated by “rational” administrative logics armed 
with scant argument and refractory to contradiction. A life in which there would 
be “governability”, but not democracy. If society does shake off politics – in other 
words, if politics does not re-establish positive dialog with the people and public 
opinion -, then storm clouds will truly come to darken the horizon. 
The present crisis therefore coincides with an unprecedented widening gulf 
between politics and society that is threatening divorce and rupture. The warning 
bells have started to ring and the red lights fl ash in Brasília. 
Given that the present scenario is neither acceptable nor desirable; that the 
politicians might be as bad as you like, but at least do not burn money or dispense 
with votes; that people in society need politics and a political system like a living 
organism needs air, we can only sustain the hypothesis that the conditions are 
being laid for a more virtuous encounter between the political and the social. 
Weighing against this hypothesis is the fact that the protagonists are 
absent, precisely the agents of this transformation, those who will lean upon the 
lever. Even though it is evident that this is just a question of time, of maturation, 
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of objective conditions, the appearance of these protagonists is also a matter of 
political will, of determination and existential effort, in other words, of rare and 
hard-to-fi nd ingredients in such liquid and fast-fl owing times as ours. 
In its favor, however, is the fact that it is precisely in liquid, fast-moving 
times that surprising articulations and movements can burst onto the scene as 
if out of the blue. After all, these are also times of connectivity and pro-active, 
well-informed individuals that need the other and some measure of political 
community in order both to pursue their solo careers and organize new and more 
sonorous groups. 
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ABSTRACT - This paper aims to explore the idea that we are currently facing a situation 
of institutional unrest and political crisis strongly concentrated on political subjectivity, that 
is, on players, ideas and projects of society. It attempts to discuss the recent crisis in Brazil’s 
Senate as an expression of this situation, but also as a refl ection of a wider framework, which 
affects modern Parliaments in general and could be seen as resultant from a siege laid by 
government decisionism and social pressures to the Legislative branch, depriving it from its 
axis and capacity to act. Echoing the dominant features of the present time, political systems 
and, by inference, Parliaments are rendered less able to interact in a virtuous way with culture 
and social structures that derive from the new terms of globalized life, that is, with plural, 
fragmented, refl exive, quick and explosive societies.
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